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TAILORING EX MACHINA: PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALIZED LAW
Gregory Klass1
University of Chicago Law Review Online (forthcoming 2022)

The place is here, the time is now, and the journey into the
shadows that we’re about to watch could be our journey.
-

Rod Serling, The Twilight Zone 2

This is a book of science fiction. Or maybe not.
-

Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalized Law: Different
Rules for Different People3

Personalized Law: Different Rules for Different People describes a type
of law that does not today exist. This is why the authors describe the
book as science fiction. Science fiction, however, is not one genre but
several.4 This Essay uses a few of those genres as ways to think
critically about Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat’s
proposals.
Ben-Shahar and Porat intend their book as hard science fiction.
Hard science fiction imagines worlds that do not violate the rules of
physics or the other sciences but are, in one way or another, more
technologically advanced than ours. In his novel The Martian, for
example, Andy Weir describes what a human mission to Mars in the
year 2036 might look like, given what we know today about the
technologies that would make it possible. Personalized Law explores
how lawmakers in the near future might use technologies we have
today—big data and artificial intelligence—to tailor legal rules to the
Agnes N. Williams Research Professor and Associate Dean for External
Programs at Georgetown University Law Center. H/t Kevin Werbach &
Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 Duke L. J. 314 (2017).
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personal histories and characteristics of individuals in the way that
advertisers use those tools today to tailor ads we see on the internet or
that insurers do to tailor policies to individual insureds.
There are other genres of science fiction as well. Much science
fiction—hard or otherwise—imagines a world either much better or
much worse than the one we live in. Dystopian science fiction includes
stories of mad scientists and technology run amok (Goethe’s Der
Zauberlehrling, Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein, The Matrix), stories of
attempted utopias gone wrong (George Orwell’s Animal Farm, Aldus
Huxley’s Brave New World, Lois Lowry’s The Giver), day-aftertomorrow scenarios that extrapolate from existing social trends
(Anthony Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange, Neal Stephenson’s Snow
Crash), and combinations of the above (Philip Dick’s short story, then
Stephen Spielberg’s movie, “Minority Report”). Although Ben-Shahar
and Porat are not writing dystopian science fiction, one can ask
whether the world they imagine doesn’t have dystopian elements.
Works of utopian or dystopian science fiction can also belong to
the broader category of social fiction. In these works, the imagined
world serves not only as a backdrop for adventures, love stories, or
other familiar narrative devices (think of the Star Wars franchise) but
also to show us something about our world. In The Left Hand of
Darkness, for example, Ursula Le Guin imagines a world in which
people alternate between genders in a way that casts light on how
assumptions about gender shape our social world. Le Guin describes
the book as a thought experiment used “not to predict the future . . .
but to describe reality, the present world.”5 Personalized Law might
also be read as a form of social fiction, revealing not only an alternative
form of law but also something about the law we have today.
So just what sort of science fiction is Personalized Law? Part I of
this Essay engages in something like fan fiction. It accepts the premise
that the book is a hard science fiction, maps Ben-Shahar and Porat’s
imagined legal reforms, and then identifies salient differences among
them. Part II explores reading Personalized Law as dystopian science
fiction. Part III considers the book as social science fiction. Part I
focuses on the idea of personalization; Parts II and III on the role of big
data and artificial intelligence in the book’s proposals.
I. Mapping the Territory
Margaret Atwood observes that works of speculative fiction often come
with a map of the world in which the action takes place. Think of the
5
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maps at the front of J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit and The Lord of the
Rings, which readers use to trace the heroes’ journeys. This part
suggests a few ways of mapping the territory covered in Personalized
Law.
Ben-Shahar and Porat state at the beginning of Part I that
“[l]aws stipulate commands” and that they will “begin the book with a
blueprint for personalized commands.”6 These pronouncements might
strike some readers as odd. First, commands are individual directives.
A command is issued to a particular person or group of persons on a
particular occasion and requires them to perform a particular action.
Laws, in distinction, are almost always formulated as rules. A law
provides that if any person or persons satisfy some criteria (driving
above a specified speed, agreeing to an exchange), there will be certain
legal consequences. I return to this difference between laws and
commands in Part II. Second, a command takes the form of “you must
x.” If any laws are akin to commands, it is laws that impose duties. But
the law does much more than impose duties. H.L.A. Hart, for example,
emphasized that laws also confer on persons powers to effect legal
change when they wish.7 And there are Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s
additional categories of privileges and immunities.8 Powers, privileges,
and immunities are not anything like commands. It might be that
these other types of law provide different opportunities for and pose
different challenges to personalization.
In fact, at most two, and arguably only one, of the candidates
that Ben-Shahar and Porat identify for personalization is a duty
tailored to characteristics of the duty bearer. The authors’ go-to
example is speed limits, which they suggest could be tailored to the
habits and abilities of individual drivers. Ironically, this is a law that
might soon be superseded by another new technology: driverless cars.
Their other example is the duty of care in the law of negligence. It is
not obvious, however, that the duty of care qualifies as a duty in a
robust sense. The law sanctions negligence only when it causes injury,
and the sanction is not a penalty but compensation to the victim. There
is a good argument that so-called duties of care in tort law are not
duties as such, but factors to use when allocating the costs of accidents
or determining which wrongs generate duties to compensate (which is
not to say that they do not also serve to provide an incentive to take
reasonable care).

Ben-Shahar and Porat, supra note 3 at 15.
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 26-49 (3d ed. 2012).
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6
7

The other laws that Ben-Shahar and Porat identify as
candidates for personalization are not duties as such. They fall into
five categories.
The first comprises what Hohfeld calls “claim rights.” Examples
include privacy rights, which limit how others can use information
about the rights-holder; consumer rights, such as mandatory terms
that attach to consumer contracts; and rights to the disclosure of
information. Although each of these involves a corresponding duty,
Ben-Shahar and Porat propose tailoring such laws not to the duty
bearer but to the right holder. This is an important distinction. As they
observe, the “[p]ersonalization of duties might raise different
challenges than the personalization of rights.”9 It might also raise very
different normative concerns.
Second, Ben-Shahar and Porat suggest personalizing some legal
privileges. The privilege of driving, for example, might be conditioned
not only on a person’s age, but also on other personal information
predictive of their driving habits. Or lawmakers might personalize the
privilege of purchasing or possessing alcohol or other controlled
substances. Privileges of this type are neither legal duties nor claim
rights but belong to a category all their own.
Ben-Shahar and Porat also suggest personalizing laws that
structure the exercise of legal powers: defaults and altering rules.
Today, defaults are commonly tailored using difficult-to-predict
standards, such as “reasonable in the circumstances.” Ben-Shahar and
Porat would instead use big data and artificial intelligence to identify
the optimal defaults for an individual power holder. The rules for
intestate distribution, for example, might be personalized based on
predictions about how the decedent would have chosen to distribute
their assets had they written a will. With respect to defaults, “optimal”
might be defined as a legal state of affairs that the person would likely
choose; the legal state of affairs the person would most benefit from;
the legal state of affairs that would, given the person’s traits, most
benefit society; or something else. The reason for choosing one or
another default will correlate with the social goal of tailoring. Although
Ben-Shahar and Porat spend fewer pages on the idea, one can also
imagine personalized altering rules, such as different testamentary
requirements for different individuals depending on their education
level, their income and wealth, magazine subscriptions, etc. Defaults
and altering rules are elements of power-conferring rules. Together
they determine how a legal power is exercised, thereby establishing
the mechanisms of legal choice.
9
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Legal sanctions comprise a fourth category. These proposals for
personalization are the closest to existing practices. There is a long
history of tailoring both pretrial-detention decisions and postconviction
sentences to the individual characteristics of a criminal defendant. The
goal of such personalization might correspond to any of the traditional
purposes of criminal punishment. One can imagine big data being used
to predict how likely a defendant is to reoffend and, therefore, the size
of the societal gains from incapacitation; to predict a defendant’s
susceptibility to one or another type of rehabilitation; or even to assess
the wrongfulness of an individual defendant’s actions—and therefore
the appropriateness of retribution.
Finally, Ben-Shahar and Porat suggest that policing might be
personalized to individual traits, such as the likelihood of offending.
Here more than elsewhere, “law” is understood in a capacious sense.
New approaches to policing address not the rules that govern legal
subjects but the mechanism we use to enforce those rules.
The point of mapping these different regions Ben-Shahar and
Porat traverse is that we might have very different intuitions about
the appropriateness of personalization in one or another area. And
from a theoretical perspective, different principles might be at stake in
each. A detailed map of the normative terrain would be the project for
a longer article. But I will note a few salient differences among the
categories.
First, as Ben-Shahar and Porat suggest, in private law it seems
relevant whether a legal duty is personalized with respect to the duty
bearer or with respect to a correlated right holder. Many existing legal
duties require the bearer to account for the individual characteristics
of those who have a right to their performance. When deciding how to
manage and disburse funds, for example, the trustee of financial assets
for a minor should take into account the minor’s situation in life,
individual needs, and personal well-being. A court appointed guardian
has a duty to take into account their charge’s individual best interests
and abilities. The idea that a sophisticated duty bearer, such as a
corporation offering products to the public, might be required to use big
data to identify the interests, preferences, or abilities of their
customers is new wine in a familiar legal bottle. That does not mean
the idea is not important. Big data might permit the expansion of both
parentalistic and choice-promoting rules to new areas of law, such as
privacy, disclosure, and consumer protection. But the structure is a
familiar one.
More radical is the idea that a person’s nonvoluntary legal
duties might depend on their own personal history and individual
characteristics. This is why it is interesting that Ben-Shahar and

Porat, despite their identification of law with commands, name so few
legal duties as candidates for personalization to the duty bearer.
Perhaps the stakes are higher with respect to personalization of this
type.
We can go a bit further down this path by thinking about a
second salient distinction—that between personalizing first-order
duties, such as speed limits, and personalizing second-order duties or
sanctions, such as a duty to compensate or criminal punishment.
Unlike first-order duties, second-order remedial obligations and
sanctions are always conditioned on a person’s prior acts—the
commission of a legal wrong. This fact might make personalization
more palatable. To commit a legal wrong is to forfeit the right to be
treated like everyone else.
Consider another piece of science fiction: Dick’s short story
“Minority Report.” Dick imagines a criminal system, “Precrime,” that
incarcerates persons based not on murders they have committed but on
highly accurate predictions of murders they are about to commit.
Proponents of Precrime emphasize its advantage over postcrime
punishment: Precrime provides the proper punishment while sparing
the life of the victim.10 Why does the Precrime system nonetheless
strike us as unjust? Perhaps because it violates our strongly held
cultural ideal that no one is fated to act wrongly, that a person is
always more than the sum of their past acts and propensities, that
every act of choice is to some degree sui generis. Punishment prior to
wrongdoing, no matter how accurate the predictive algorithm, violates
that principle.
How does all this relate to first-order duties like speed limits?
Speed limits are not punishments. Yet the thought that even though a
person has committed no wrong, the state might use their past
behavior to limit their sphere of freedom pushes up against the same
intuitions and principles. One might feel similarly about personalized
privileges, like the privilege to drive or purchase alcohol. Personalizing
remedial obligations and sanctions, in contrast, is less problematic.
Yet another salient distinction is between using a person’s
personal history and characteristics to assign them one or another
legal status (duty, power, privilege, or immunity) and personalizing
the rules that implement that legal status. Consider private legal
powers. Ben-Shahar and Porat nowhere suggest using big data and
artificial intelligence to determine who has the power to contract or to
execute an effective last will and testament—though the tools they
Phlip K. Dick, “Minority Report” in The Collected Stories of Philip K. Dick,
Vol. 4 71, 84 (1991).
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describe might be deployed to do so. They recommend only that we
personalize the mechanisms through which such legal powers are
exercised—defaults and altering rules. I find this unsurprising.
Personalizing how a person can exercise a legal power strikes me as
less problematic than personalizing who has the power.11 The same
might be true of duties, privileges, and immunities.12
A last set of conceptual distinctions, or another set of mapping
coordinates, lies along a different axis. Ben-Shahar and Porat do not
provide a systematic account of the types of individual characteristics
that personalized law might attend to. The examples they use,
however, suggest three broad categories. Defaults, they argue, should
generally be tailored to a person’s likely preferences. Personalized
disclosure rules, in distinction, are to be tailored to the right holder’s
ability to use information presented in one or another format. Criminal
sanctions, finally, should be personalized according to the defendant’s
propensity to reoffend or to respond to reform. A complete account of
the normative landscape of personalization should also consider
possible differences between personalizing for preferences, abilities, or
propensities, as well as other possible candidates such as needs or
interests. It might be, for example, that we are more comfortable
personalizing for preferences and abilities than we are for needs and
propensities. Whether, why, and when this is so, and whether there
are other sorts of characteristics one might use for personalization,
would be worth exploring.

The distinction between granting a legal power and determining how it is
exercised can be slippery. Legal powers come with altering rules, and any
given altering rule might make it more or less costly to exercise the power.
When the costs get high enough, one might say that the power, for practical
purposes, no longer exists. That said, deciding whether to grant a legal power
is a decision of a different type than is deciding how that power is exercised.
12
Ben-Shahar and Porat suggest that “default rules provide a good starting
point” for their personalization project, as people can always contract around
them. Ben-Shahar and Porat, supra note 3 at 239. My point is different. It is
that personalized implementation rules are perhaps, as a class, less
troublesome than the personalized assignment of one or another legal status.
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II. A Personalized Dystopia?
O wonder!
How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is! O, brave new world
That has such people in’t.
-

William Shakespeare, The Tempest13

The above mapping is a sort of fan fiction. It explores the world
that Ben-Shahar and Porat construct in directions they do not go but
remaining within the bounds of the project. A different question is
whether theirs is a world we would want to live in. Ben-Shahar and
Porat occasionally and perhaps ironically describe their model as “our
brave new world.”14 Whether this is a nod to Shakespeare or to Aldous
Huxley, it suggests asking whether there isn’t a dark underbelly to
their utopia.
The authors spend several chapters on Frankenstein scenarios:
possible unintended consequences of personalized lawmaking. These
include practical worries about personalized coordination rules, the
possibility that sophisticated legal subjects will game the system, and
the risk that algorithms will pick up the residue of past discriminatory
practices, compounding those wrongs.
Writers of science fiction have suggested yet other ways societies
can go wrong. One is captured in Juvenal’s question: “Quis custodiet
ipsos custodes?” Who will oversee the overseers? Terry Gilliam’s film
Brazil, for example, depicts an absurdly impersonal bureaucracy in
which a minor paperwork error (caused by a fly landing in a printer)
results in a cascade of misfortune for characters who have no avenues
of appeal. The overseer might make mistakes. And in his film adaption
of “Minority Report,” Stephen Spielberg imagines the founder of
Precrime manipulating the system to hide a murder he commits and to
implicate another for the crime. The overseer might also misuse their
power.
Existing forms of lawmaking and adjudication are not immune
from quis custodiet problems. Michael Allan Wolff has documented the
persistent influence of typos in U.S. Supreme Court slip opinions.15
And Robert Caro describes how Robert Moses effectively nullified a
legislative provision sunsetting the Triborough Bridge Authority by
burying an apparently innocuous sentence deep in an amendment to a
William Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act V, Scene I, ll. 203–206.
Ben-Shahar and Porat, supra note 3 at xi, 4, 202.
15
Michael Allan Wolf, A Reign of Error: Property Rights and Stare Decisis, 99
Wash. U. L. Rev. 449 (2021).
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separate section of the enabling statute.16 But there are reasons to
think that these risks are more significant in Ben-Shahar and Porat’s
brave new world.
In our legal system, lawmaking and adjudication are
accomplished using words. Legislators and their staffs debate and
discuss; regulators generate reports, solicit comments, and hold
hearings; parties write briefs and engage in oral arguments; judges
and clerks write memos and ultimately issue opinions. Words also play
a role in Ben-Shahar and Porat’s world. But the tools of lawmaking
and adjudication also include statistical analysis, computer code, and
machine learning. We will need workers with specialized knowledge to
implement personalized law: computer scientists who will create the
algorithms, data managers who will provide the inputs, and
statisticians who will check the results.
There is no reason to think that computer scientists, data
managers, and statisticians are less trustworthy than are legislators,
lawyers, and judges. But their errors and abuses are less visible.
Because our legal system operates primarily in words, when things go
wrong, it is relatively easy to understand how and why. Adam Liptak
can explain to readers of the New York Times a Supreme Court typo
and its effects; Caro can describe Robert Moses’s sleight to a general
audience. A flaw or trick in an algorithm using machine learning to
synthesize millions of pieces of data, in distinction, might be
intelligible only to those with the technical expertise to identify or
understand it. Handing over parts of lawmaking to technicians means
rendering parts of it obscure. The overseers’ work is hidden from view.
The Hollywood script almost writes itself.
But the problems run deeper. Algorithmically driven
personalization differs from existing forms of legislation and
adjudication in two additional significant respects.
The first returns us to the topic of rules and commands. Existing
forms of legislation and adjudication generate and apply rules: general
propositions that associate with generically described actions, events,
and other facts about the world specified legal consequences. Even
when a common-law court decides a case of first impression—one for
which there is yet no rule—the norms of adjudication require it to
announce a rule to explain its holding.
Algorithmically driven personalized law, in distinction,
generates commands or other particularized dictates. A person is told
that here and now they may drive no faster than forty-four miles per
16
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hour. But no one is told under which circumstances they should drive
that speed or when someone else should. An algorithm might tell a
probate court how to distribute an individual intestate decedent’s
property. But it will not provide a rule that one could use to predict
when another decedent will be provided a similar distribution or what
this decedent might have done to get a different one. The algorithm
issues its dictates in the form of commands, not rules.
All this is important because the rule of law requires treating
like cases alike. The rule of law presupposes a law comprised of rules,
not commands. Algorithmically driven personalized law, as BenShahar and Porat imagine it, does not provide that.
The objection suggests an alternative: rather than personalizing
law into commands, big data and artificial intelligence could in some
circumstances be used to further specify legal rules. Although any legal
rule can be stated in a general form (“if any person . . ., then . . .”), a
rule can be more or less specific depending on how many conditions
replace the first ellipsis and how detailed the legal consequences
replacing the second. This is not what Ben-Shahar and Porat propose.
Nor does greater specification of rules get us all the advantages of
personalized rulemaking. Still, one might take the project in that
direction.
A second difference between algorithmically driven personalized
law and existing forms of lawmaking generates a more intractable
worry.
Although the processes of legislation and adjudication are often
complex and jargon laden, they are largely accessible by and explicable
to the public. That access is important not only because it makes it
easier to discover errors and abuses (the quis custodiet worry) but also
because law should be a democratic institution. A democratic law does
not merely issue rules and rulings; it provides reasons for them.
Ben-Shahar and Porat’s proposal requires artificial intelligence
to crunch masses of data to get desired outcomes. But artificial
intelligence operates in a black box. Machine-learning algorithms are
programmed to try out many different ways to analyze the data, assess
the outputs, and then use those assessments to further develop the
processes. After thousands, tens of thousands, or millions of iterations,
the resulting processes can be so complex as to be impossible to unpack
or understand. Those who program the machine to learn do not, in the
end, know what it has learned—what happens inside the box—but are
left evaluate the program’s success only by sampling its outputs.
When our law treats different people differently—when it
punishes some and not others, when it denies privileges or powers to

some that it grants to others, and even when it applies different
defaults to different types of parties—those subject to the law expect to
be told why.17 Turning over personalization to artificial intelligence
threatens to render those reasons opaque. In short, the algorithm
provides neither rule nor reason. If it spoke French, it might explain
its commands in one sentence: L’état, c’est moi.
Like Ben-Shahar and Porat’s book, the above paragraphs engage
in a form of science fiction, albeit of a different genre. Ben-Shahar and
Porat do not advocate using big data and artificial intelligence to
personalize all law. And as I observed in Part I, the stakes of
personalization differ depending both on the type of law and on the
types of characteristics the algorithm attends to. The above reductio ad
dystopiam does not demonstrate that there are not gains to be had
from some types of personalization in some areas of law. It does,
however, suggest some costs of algorithmically applied personalization
no matter where or how it is applied.
III. Personalized Law as Social Fiction
And when the poets can’t come up with anything
And have said absolutely everything in their plays
They lift the crane just like a finger
And the spectators get their money’s worth.
-

Antiphanes18

Ben-Shahar and Porat have an answer to worries such as the above:
Their brave new world may not be perfect, but it is better than the one
we live in. If artificial intelligence occurs in a black box, at least it is
not subject to the self-interest and persistent biases of legislators and
judges. “[P]ersonalized law has the potential to sanitize lawmaking
and law enforcement” both of the influence of special interests and of
biased human decision-making.19 It does so by providing a different
type of transparency: transparency of goals. Machine-learning
algorithms cannot decide for themselves what counts as a correct
analysis of the data. That must be specified at the outset by human
decision makers. Whereas, today, legislators and judges need not agree
upon the goals they seek to achieve, algorithmic lawmaking and
In a 241-page book, Ben-Shahar and Porat devote one paragraph near the
end to the so-called right to explanation. Ben-Shahar and Porat, supra note 3
at 237-38.
18
Poesis, in The Birth of Comedy: Texts, Documents, and Art from Athenian
Comic Competitions, 486-280, 507 (J. Rusten ed., Johns Hopikins University
Press 2011).
19
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adjudication will force them to specify “[t]he law’s goals and values . . .
in advance with exact precision so that algorithms would know what to
maximize.”20 Ben-Shahar and Porat celebrate transparency of this
type:
Personalized law would require a degree of clarity and
forethought in setting the objective of any law. No longer could
lawmakers fudge this determination, deferring the explicit
reconciliation of the law’s competing goals to judges, or inviting
enforcers to tease out the goals by subsequent refined inquiry.
Any ambivalence, crudeness, or uncertainty over the law’s goals
and the costs associated with deviations from the goals would
disrupt the personalization algorithm, or leave too much power
in the hands of those writing the code. Moreover, lawmakers
would not be able to merely state several cumulative goals of a
statute; an exact weighing of their relative importance would
instead be necessary.21
Personalized lawmaking requires lawmakers to come to agreement on
a law’s goals and, when those goals conflict, on their relative weights.
Only then can they turn things over to the computer scientists, data
managers, and statisticians to determine the means that best achieve
those goals in proportion to the importance of each.
Although Ben-Shahar and Porat identify transparency of goals
as a benefit of algorithmically personalized law, this transparency is
not what drives their project. The book focuses on the substantive
gains that might be had from personalized law, as distinguished from
process benefits. Transparency of legislative ends is, in their story, a
happy side effect. But we need not wait for the rule of algorithms to
ask lawmakers to better articulate the ends they seek to achieve and
their relative weights. If complete transparency of ends is such a good,
why not require it today?
One explanation is practical. Where there is disagreement
within society about the proper ends of lawmaking, “fudging it”
permits lawmakers to reach compromise. But there is also a more
principled reason to resist the idea that lawmakers should first fully
specify the law’s ends, after which they or someone else will determine

Id. at 232-33.
Id. at 36. See also Id. at 233 (“Legislators could no longer merely compile a
grocery list of statutory purposes in deliberating or drafting the statute. And
courts—when recognizing conflicting goals and seeking to balance them—
could no longer disguise ideological preferences and would have to follow
quantitative instructions and use actual specified weights. No fudging.”).
20
21

the best means to achieving them: it relies on a false picture of
practical reasoning.
Practical reasoning is not algorithmic, proceeding mechanically
from major premise (ends) through minor premise (available means) to
conclusion (act). Intelligent practical reasoning requires that as we
reason through the means of achieving our ends, we also reflect on
those ends, further specify them, and sometimes alter them in light of
the available means.22 Although we generally begin a practical project
with a general idea of our ends, rarely can we fully specify them or
their relative weights in all circumstances. We arrive at those
specifications only by thinking through, or even trying out, possible
means of achieving those initial ends. If one or another means is
particularly attractive or brings additional benefits, we might add it to
the ends to be achieved. If the available means are too expensive, too
harmful, too unfair, or too unjust, the reasonable thing to do is to alter
our ends. We reason about ends not in the abstract, but in the
concrete—through our attempts to realize them in the world.
An algorithm-driven personalized law is like a planned economy,
except that, whereas in a planned economy officials decide in advance
how much bread, milk, and toilet paper the citizenry will need, in
personalized law, lawmakers decide in advance the ends of a law and
their relative weights. If such a system looks strange, it is because it
assumes a level of foresight and judgment that even the most
dedicated lawmaker does not have.
Ben-Shahar and Porat’s science fiction account of algorithmic
lawmaking thereby highlights something we might not otherwise
notice about existing forms of lawmaking: they are often structured to
allow for experimental and iterative forms of practical reasoning. The
common law is the example par excellence. A common law court begins
with rules and principles established by prior decisions but should
stand ready to limit, revise, and even occasionally reject them based on
experience with their practical application. Arthur Linton Corbin, who
titled his major work, “A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working
Rules of Contract Law,” captures the idea:
In a superficial aspect, the application of rules to cases may
seem to be a deductive process; a pre-existing general rule is the
major premise from which the judge arrives at a particular
conclusion applicable to John Doe. In fact, however, the law in
its growth and application is an inductive process. The supposed
For more on this point, see Henry R. Richardson, Practical Reasoning about
Final Ends (1997); Henry R. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost Benefit
Standard, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 971 (2000).
22

pre-existing rule is a mere assumption of the court. . . . The
supposed general rule is an inductive conclusion on the part of
the judge from preceding individual instances. His decision of
the case is a new instance which later judges and theorists will
use as the basis of a new induction. In all cases the judge must
construct his own major premise.23
Empirical and iterative reasoning about ends is not, however, limited
to the common law. A legislature might identify goals at a high level of
generality, then leave it to an agency to further specify them through
processes of deliberative rulemaking and revision. And the U.S.
Constitution itself invites the legislature, the courts, and the executive
to continually specify and respecify the goals, principles, and limits set
out in it through their application and, one hopes, in light of our
experience with them.
Personalized Law is science fiction not only because it imagines
an alternative form of law but also because it imagines an alternative
form of lawmaking. Perhaps in some spheres, algorithmic lawmaking
of this type is possible and could bring benefits. But in many others, it
presupposes abilities that human lawmakers do not possess. Here BenShahar and Porat engage in science fiction of an especially interesting
type. The form of lawmaking they imagine does not so much show us a
better way of doing things as it does help us better understand the way
we do things now.

Arthur Linton Corbin, The Law and The Judges, 3 Yale Rev. N.S. 234, 239
(1914).
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